The UK government is planning to introduce stakeholder pensions from April 2001 as an alternative to existing personal pensions for people on moderate earnings. But stakeholder pensions are only one way to save for retirement; the new tax-free Individual Savings Account (ISA) is another. This note compares the tax treatments of pensions and ISAs and assesses the conditions under which the tax treatment of private pensions is more generous than that of an ISA to a basicrate taxpayer -the typical target for stakeholder pensions. The abolition of dividend tax credits paid to pension funds in July 1997 reduced the relatively tax-favoured position of pensions, but the tax-free lump sum means that private pensions continue to be a tax-favoured form of saving at most reasonable rates of return. We show that employer contributions to private pensions are particularly tax-favoured.
I. INTRODUCTION
The government's recently published Green Paper, Partnership in Pensions, contained proposals for reform to the UK pension system. 1 These include the introduction of stakeholder pensions from April 2001, which the government hopes will offer a 'low cost, flexible and secure' alternative to existing personal pensions.
2 Making stakeholder pensions cheaper and more flexible than existing personal pensions will increase the attraction of pension saving. However, stakeholder pensions are only one possible vehicle in which individuals can save for their retirement. The new tax-free Individual Savings Account (ISA) is another. Compared with stakeholder pensions, ISAs have the attraction of not tying up savings until retirement. This is likely to be important for people in the target group for stakeholder pensions -those earning between £9,000 and £18,500 who do not currently have a private pension. Disney, Emmerson and Tanner (1999) show that members of this group are likely to have interrupted employment, fluctuating earnings and little or no other savings and may prefer to place future savings in a liquid form.
However, the impact of the differential tax treatment of savings held in a private pension compared with an ISA could be an important influence on saving decisions. The abolition of dividend tax credits paid to pension funds in July 1997 reduced the tax advantage given to pensions, since a 10 per cent dividend tax credit is paid to people holding shares in an ISA, at least for the first five years. But saving in a pension continues to benefit from individuals being able to take up to one-quarter of the value of the fund as a tax-free lump sum on retirement. This note compares the tax treatments of private pensions and of ISAs and assesses the conditions under which the tax treatment of private pensions is more generous than that of an ISA to a basic-rate taxpayer -the typical target for stakeholder pensions. We show that private pensions continue to be a relatively tax-favoured form of saving, particularly when contributions are made by employers since these are not subject to income tax or National Insurance contributions.
II. THE TAX TREATMENT OF PENSIONS AND ISAs
There are three possible points for taxing saving -the initial payments, the returns received on the investment (income and capital gain) and withdrawal. In the case of individuals' contributions out of earned income into a private pension, full tax relief is given at the marginal income tax rate. 3 However, employers will have paid National Insurance (NI) on the gross earnings out of which individuals' contributions are made and the individuals will also have paid employee NI, albeit at the reduced, contracted-out rate. When employers make contributions, however, as is the case in occupational pension schemes, these are not subject to employee or employer NI. 4 No tax is incurred on returns accruing within a pension fund and, before July 1997, dividend tax credits were payable at a rate of 20 per cent on shares held in a private pension. In retirement, individuals are required to use the accumulated fund to purchase an annuitywith the exception of one-quarter of the fund, which can be taken as a tax-free lump sum -and pay income tax on annuity income (see Table 1 ).
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In July 1997, the payment of 20 per cent dividend tax credits to pension funds was abolished. Every £1 of dividend income was worth £1.25 before July 1997 but only £1 after the change. 6 This reduced the tax-favoured position of pensions compared with their treatment prior to July 1997. But an important issue for saving decisions is whether pensions are now given more or less favourable tax treatment than other forms of saving. The tax-free lump sum is important in this respect, as are opportunities for tax arbitrage -that is, the possibility for 5 Purchase of an annuity is mandatory only after age 75 and income withdrawal is possible up to this age (see Murthi, Orszag and Orszag (1999) for further information). 6 Note that the overall effect on the return to holding shares in a pension fund will depend on the dividend payout ratio, which might be expected to change as a result of the abolition of tax credits. Announcing the change, the Chancellor said that 'abolishing payable tax credits [would] remove a distortion in the tax system that has encouraged the distribution of profits rather than their retention for reinvestment, and has favoured investments yielding dividends rather than capital growth'. individuals to reduce their overall tax burden by getting relief on contributions at a higher rate than that at which tax is paid on withdrawal. The opportunity for tax arbitrage makes pensions particularly attractive to higher-rate taxpayers. The tax-free personal allowance and the 10 per cent tax-rate band might provide an opportunity for tax arbitrage by basic-rate taxpayers, but in practice most people will receive income from the basic state pension and the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) or the State Second Pension at least equal to the value of the tax-free personal allowance and the 10p band. This will also be true for people who 'opt out' of the State Second Pension since the contracted-out rebates are intended to be designed in such a way that individuals are no worse off than if they were in the state scheme. Finally, the fact that employer pension contributions are not subject to employer and employee NI (and that no NI is payable on withdrawal) makes these an extremely tax-effective way of saving, as we show later. Employer contributions could become more important with the introduction of stakeholder pensions. Since the government is going to compel employers to designate a provider and allow employees to make contributions directly from their paypacket (Department of Social Security, 1999b), the fixed costs associated with employer contributions will have already been met and this could lead to an increase in employer contributions.
Individual Savings Accounts replaced Tax-Exempt Special Savings Accounts (TESSAs) and Personal Equity Plans (PEPs) from April 1999. They provide a single tax-free savings vehicle for holdings of cash, life insurance and stocks and shares. They are subject to an overall annual investment limit of £5,000 (£7,000 in 1999-2000), with separate limits of £1,000 on the amount that can be held as life insurance and of £1,000 (£3,000 in the first year) on the amount that can be held in cash. Individuals pay into ISAs out of income that is net of tax and NI contributions, but the returns on assets held in an ISA are tax-free and no tax is due when funds are withdrawn from an ISA. Equity investments in ISAs are exempt from capital gains tax, and a 10 per cent tax credit will be paid on all dividends from UK equities. This is less generous than the 20 per cent dividend tax credit that was paid to holders of PEPs prior to April 1999. For every £1 of dividend income paid, an ISA-holder will get £1.11 compared with £1.25 previously received by a PEP-holder. The government has promised that the returns to ISAs are guaranteed tax-free for at least 10 years, while the 10 per cent dividend tax credit will stay at least until April 2004. The age-and earnings-related rebates paid into defined contribution schemes (i.e. contracted-out money purchase schemes, approved personal pensions and stakeholder pensions) are calculated by the Government Actuary's Department to compensate fully for the loss in second-tier state pension. Defined benefit schemes can only opt out if they meet certain reference criteria. For further details, see Bacon & Woodrow (1999) , for example. 8 Source: HM Treasury (1998, sections 5.63 to 5.66).
III. COMPARING THE TAX TREATMENT OF PENSIONS AND ISAs
Which is more favourably taxed, a private pension or an ISA? For basic-rate taxpayers, the answer depends on whether the value of the tax relief on the lump sum in the case of a private pension is worth more than the value of the dividend tax credit in the case of an ISA. In turn, this depends on the annual rate of return. The greater the annual rate of return, the greater the value of the dividend tax credit, assuming a constant dividend pay-out ratio. 9 We use simple examples to compare the overall return to investing in a private pension and a tax-free savings scheme at different annual rates of return.
Our examples are based on an individual who earns £15,000 a year -that is, someone in the stakeholder target earnings band -who invests 10 per cent of their net earnings for 30 years in either a private pension or a tax-free savings scheme. We assume that the marginal income tax rate is 23 per cent, as is currently the case for basic-rate taxpayers in the UK. In addition, earnings are subject to employer and employee NI contributions at the 1999-2000 rates of 9.2 and 8.4 per cent respectively. In effect, by assuming that the same rate of NI is paid in both cases, we are assuming that the individual has already decided to opt out of the state scheme and is choosing where to invest their marginal pound of contributions. We do not consider the option of staying in the state scheme (paying higher NI contributions) and investing in an ISA. We assume that tax relief is given on money invested in a pension at the marginal rate of income tax and that one-quarter of the total value of the pension fund is taken as a tax-free lump sum at the end of 30 years. The impact of tax arbitrage for basic-rate taxpayers is ignored since it is assumed that the combined value of the basic state pension and the pension income from investing the contracted-out rebate uses up the individual's personal allowance and 10p band.
The rate of return (expressed in real terms) is assumed to be the same for a private pension as for an ISA. It is possible that, perhaps due to having funds that are locked away for longer periods of time, pension providers are able to deliver higher rates of return than ISAs. In fact, the median annualised real return over the last five years for PEPs investing in UK companies was 10 per cent -the same as for pension funds investing in UK equities. 10 We assume a 50 per cent dividend pay-out ratio and show the sensitivity of our results to this assumption later on. We also assume that both ISAs and pensions are subject to a charge of 1 per cent of the annual value of the fund. This is the rate that currently applies to CAT-standard ISAs and the rate that has been proposed for stakeholder pensions.
11 Table 2 shows the total net value of the fund in a pension or ISA after 30 years at different annual rates of investment return. The total amount that the individual invests out of net income over 30 years is £30,870. 12 The difference between this and the net fund value in the different schemes is determined by the annual investment return and the tax system. The final column of Table 2 shows the net value of the fund saved in a tax-free savings account with no dividend tax credit. We use this bench-mark to illustrate the impact of differences in investment returns on the overall return after 30 years. Differences from this reflect the impact of the tax system. Table 3 expresses the fund value of a private pension and an ISA with a dividend tax credit relative to this bench-mark case.
The net value of the pension fund is 10.49 per cent higher than the benchmark case of a tax-free savings scheme with no dividend tax credit. The effect of the tax-free lump sum is to increase the net value of the pension fund by 7.47 per cent.
13 The higher 10.49 per cent figure arises from the fact that, in the case of a pension, only income tax, not NI, is deferred. This means that individuals are 11 See Department of Social Security (1999a) for details of the cost requirements for stakeholder pensions. Financial Services Authority (1999) provides details of ISAs. A higher limit of 3 per cent applies to insurance with CAT-marked ISAs. 12 i.e. 30 × 0.1 × 15000 × (1-0.23-0.084). only liable to income tax on contributions (and returns) net of NI, not on the full amount of their gross earnings as they would be in a tax-free savings scheme. This increases the final net value of investing the same amount in a pension rather than in a tax-free savings scheme. Note that the 10.49 per cent figure is the same, irrespective of the annual investment return. Whether, at the end of 30 years, the individual is better off having invested in a pension or a tax-free savings scheme depends on the annual investment return. The higher the investment return, the greater the value of the dividend tax credit (assuming a constant dividend pay-out ratio) and the more likely it is that investing in a savings scheme will yield a larger fund than investing in a pension.
14 If the annual real investment return is less than 9.8 per cent, the net value of the pension fund after 30 years is greater than the value of the same amount invested in a savings scheme. If the annual rate of return is higher than this, the total value of the fund invested in a savings scheme is greater.
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The results in Tables 2 and 3 are based on a 50 per cent dividend pay-out ratio. Table 4 illustrates the sensitivity of our results to this assumption. It shows the dividend pay-out ratios required for the tax treatment of an ISA with a 30-year tax credit to be as generous as that of employee contributions to a private pension at different annual rates of return. For example, if the real rate of return is 10 per cent, then at least 48.9 per cent of the return must be paid as dividends for the fund in an ISA to be worth as much as a pension fund after 30 years. If dividend pay-out ratios fall, then this increases further the generosity of the tax treatment of private pensions relative to that of an ISA. 14 All our examples are expressed in real terms. However, higher inflation will also make the dividend tax credit more valuable since it is paid as a percentage of nominal dividend income.
It should be pointed out that if the values of the fund invested in a savings scheme and in a pension were the same, the greater liquidity of funds in savings schemes would tend to make them more attractive. a This is the dividend pay-out ratio required to make the tax treatment of an ISA at least as generous as the tax treatment of a pension, given the annual investment return.
An annual real rate of return of 9.8 per cent may not seem unreasonable, given a median annualised real return to PEPs and pensions of 10 per cent over the last five years. Also, the greater liquidity of an ISA may be enough to compensate people for a slightly lower investment return. However, these comparisons have assumed that dividend tax credit is paid for the full 30 years in the tax-free savings scheme. In fact, the government has only guaranteed the dividend tax credit for five years, although it is quite possible for it to be extended beyond this date. If the dividend tax credit is only paid for five years, the real rate of return at which the value of the dividend tax credit is greater than the tax relief on the lump sum increases substantially to an implausible 93.6 per cent.
Finally, consider the case of pension contributions made by the employer. Individual contributions are made out of income that is exempt from income tax but will have been subject to employee NI at the rate of 8.4 per cent. The employer must also pay NI on the individual's gross income at a rate of 9.2 per cent. 16 If, on the other hand, the employer contributes to the pension, the contributions are not subject to employee or employer NI. The effect of this is to increase the tax-favoured status of private pensions, over and above a tax-free savings vehicle with no dividend tax credit, from the 10.49 per cent figure shown in Table 3 to 31.7 per cent.
17 This is regardless of the level of real investment return. In this case, for an ISA to be as attractive as a pension requires a real rate of return of more than 25.4 per cent, even assuming a 10 per cent dividend tax credit for the full 30 years and a 50 per cent dividend pay-out ratio.
The current tax system particularly favours pension contributions by the employer rather than by the employee. This is typically the case in occupational pension schemes. But it also creates an incentive for individuals with a personal pension (or a stakeholder pension) to receive part of their remuneration in the form of pension contributions rather than wages. The employee could even afford to compensate the employer for any additional administration costs that were incurred. 18 In the case of stakeholder pensions, the employer will be required to designate a stakeholder scheme and allow employees to make payroll deductions anyway. Given that the fixed costs of setting up a payroll deduction facility will already have been incurred, this can only make employer contributions more likely.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Voluntary saving for retirement can be done either through a designated pension product, such as the proposed stakeholder pension, or an alternative such as an Individual Savings Account. An ISA offers more flexibility since the money is not tied up until retirement -and the fund does not have to be used to purchase an annuity. However, this note has shown that the tax system creates strong incentives for people to invest in pensions if dividend tax credits are only paid to ISA-holders for five years. The tax position of pensions looks even more favourable if contributions are made by employers, since these are not subject to employer or employee National Insurance. Note: These percentages express the additional net fund value in alternative savings vehicles compared with investing in a tax-free savings scheme where no dividend tax credit is paid.
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The individual would accept a lower gross salary in return for the employer making contributions on their behalf. Some of the savings from paying lower NI would have to be paid into the employee's pension fund to compensate them for the reduction in contracted-out rebate. However, the NI savings are always more than enough to make up for this shortfall.
The impact of the tax system on the returns to saving in different forms is illustrated by Table 5 , which summarises the additional net fund value from investing the same amount in different savings vehicles compared with a benchmark of a tax-free savings scheme with no dividend tax credits. For comparison, we also show the returns to saving in pensions prior to July 1997, and to PEPs prior to April 1999, both of which had dividend tax credits paid at 20 per cent.
Economic efficiency in the taxation of saving requires that, in the absence of an existing market failure, taxation should not affect people's decisions about what form to save in. The government might want to encourage people to save in a designated retirement savings vehicle. However, there needs to be a good reason for this to be the case -not least because of the exchequer cost of such generous treatment. For example, the government's decision to make meanstested benefits more generous to pensioners may mean it wants individuals to be compelled to annuitise their wealth when they retire. However, this does not explain either the current level of generosity, particularly to individuals who are unlikely to be reliant on the state in retirement, or the different tax treatment of employer and employee contributions. The potential problem with taxing different forms of saving differently is that it results in saving decisions being driven not by underlying returns or preferences for liquidity, but by the tax system. Also, the current tax system is most generous to people who can afford to lock up their savings until retirement, which may be seen as inequitable.
